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Today, more employees than ever before have ownership stakes in their ﬁ  rms 
through Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and ﬁ  rm-  based stock 
ownership plans, receive stock options once limited to top executives, and are 
covered by proﬁ  t-  sharing plans. The media has publicized both the rewards 
and dangers of tying worker pay and wealth to company performance. The 
1990s produced many stories of regular employees becoming millionaires 
by working in Silicon Valley ﬁ  rms with broad-  based options that paid oﬀ 
handsomely. The early 2000s produced stories about Enron employees losing 
their retirement moneys in a 401(k) plan that was heavily concentrated in 
company stock. Apart from the extreme cases that get publicized, are these 
programs generally good or bad for workers?
This chapter uses the General Social Survey (GSS) and NBER data sets 
to analyze the relationship of shared capitalism programs to a range of 
employee outcomes: participation in decisions, supervision, training, com-
pany treatment of employees, pay, job security, and job satisfaction.
8.1    What  We  Expect
On the basis of incentive and organization theory and previous empirical 
work, we expect that linking employee pay to company performance will 
impact workers in several ways.
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8.1.1      Employee Participation in Decision Making
Shared capitalist compensation systems should be associated with greater 
freedom for workers to make decisions at their workplace. It is diﬃcult to 
imagine a ﬁ  rm devolving decisions to workers without developing some 
pecuniary mechanism for motivating them to make decisions in the ﬁ  rm’s 
interest, be it proﬁ  t sharing, gain sharing, stock options, or share ownership. 
Indeed, one common reason for ﬁ  rms to institute compensation systems 
relating employee pay to company performance is to induce workers to make 
decisions that improve ﬁ  rm performance (assessed in chapter 4).
Two national surveys of workers have found the expected relation. For the 
United States, Dube and Freeman (2001) found a positive relation between 
shared capitalist compensation systems and employee decision making in 
Freeman and Rogers’ (2006) Worker Representation and Participation Sur-
vey, with strong results for proﬁ  t sharing but weak results for employee 
ownership. For the United Kingdom, Conyon and Freeman (2004) found a 
positive link between changes in variable pay and changes in decision mak-
ing in the Workplace Employment Relations Survey. However, ﬁ  rm-  based 
studies of employee ownership ﬁ  nd only a weak pattern between perceived 
or desired participation in decision making and employee ownership. Half 
of the ten studies reviewed by Kruse and Blasi (1997) found participation 
levels higher with employee ownership while half found no diﬀerence in par-
ticipation. None of the studies found a connection between participation in 
decisions and the size of one’s ownership stake. Two of the studies that asked 
about desired participation found no diﬀerence between employee-  owners 
and nonowners, while a third study found a decline in desired worker par-
ticipation after an employee buyout, which the author attributes to wariness 
by employees about the commitment levels of new employees and trust in 
management (Long 1981, 1982).
8.1.2      Supervision, Training, and Workplace Relations
Any shared compensation system must overcome potential free rider 
problems. The larger the number of people who share in the rewards of 
the ﬁ  rm or group, the lower is the incentive for the individual to work hard 
and the greater the reward to shirking. In chapter 2, we ﬁ  nd that worker 
monitoring of the group is an important mode for overcoming the free rider 
problem. Firms cannot force workers to self-  monitor but they can provide 
supportive supervision, training, and a workplace climate that encourages 
group norms to sustain a self-  monitoring equilibrium.
Few studies have examined the relation of shared capitalism programs to 
supervision, training, and workplace climate. Regarding supervision, Pen-
dleton (2006) ﬁ  nds greater employee discretion in establishments with broad-
  based employee ownership plans. Brown and Sessions (2003) report that 
employees in performance- related pay plans have more positive views about Do Workers Gain by Sharing?    2 5 9
management-  employee relations and how the workplace is run. Consistent 
with the idea of improved management-  employee relations, the probability 
of a strike goes down after a unionized ﬁ  rm adopts an ESOP (Cramton, 
Mehran, and Tracy 2008). Two studies have found that employees in proﬁ  t-
  sharing plans are more likely to receive employer-  provided training (Azfar 
and Danninger 2001; Robinson and Zhang 2005). One study found mixed 
eﬀects of proﬁ  t sharing on relations among co-  workers, with proﬁ  t sharing 
increasing cooperation for nonsupervisory personnel but decreasing it for 
supervisors, and having no eﬀect for those who highly value cooperation on 
the job (Heywood, Jirjahn, and Tsertsvadze 2005b). A companion study 
found that proﬁ  t sharing reduces worker- management conﬂ  ict for nonsuper-
visory workers in excellent health, but not for supervisors or those not in 
excellent health (Heywood, Jirjahn, and Tsertsvadze 2005a).
Two studies have examined whether workplaces are safer under shared 
employee ownership. Rooney (1992) found fewer OSHA injuries in employee 
ownership companies with greater worker participation in decisions, but 
otherwise found mixed results for ownership without participation. Rhodes 
and Steers (1981) found that accidents were no lower in a plywood coopera-
tive compared to a standard plywood company.
8.1.3    Pay  and  Beneﬁ  ts
There are two reasons for expecting shared capitalist compensation sys-
tems to be associated with higher pay and beneﬁ  ts.
First, shared capitalist systems could operate in part as a “gift exchange” 
between the worker and the ﬁ  rm, in which the higher pay increases worker 
eﬀort, decreases turnover, and increases worker loyalty (Akerlof 1982). 
By encouraging employee cooperation, shared capitalism programs could 
increase output, some of which would go to workers as their share of proﬁ  ts 
and some as higher base wages or beneﬁ  ts. The sharing system would be a 
key component of a mutual-  gains or high-  commitment system where both 
workers and the ﬁ  rms come out ahead (Handel and Levine 2004, 5). While 
employers may get some gift exchange beneﬁ  ts simply by raising levels of 
ﬁ  xed pay, the provision of this higher compensation in the form of shared 
capitalist pay may further help to create and reinforce a sense of common 
interests and incentives for discouraging free riding. Second, since shared 
capitalism increases risk to workers, compensating diﬀerential theory pre-
dicts that workers will want higher overall compensation. Whether this com-
pensation takes the form of ﬁ  xed pay and beneﬁ  ts or shows up in a larger 
share in proﬁ  ts and ownership is unclear. Again, what creates the potential 
for higher income to workers is the higher productivity generated by the sys-
tem. If the higher compensation is only enough to compensate for the added 
risk, then we might see some greater eﬀort by employees to justify the higher 
compensation, but would not expect other changes in attitudes and behavior 
associated with a gift exchange (higher commitment and loyalty, reduced 260    Douglas L. Kruse, Richard B. Freeman, and Joseph R. Blasi
turnover, etc.). If the higher compensation also provides a gift on top of the 
risk premium to help change attitudes and behaviors, shared capitalism will 
need to pay for itself through large productivity improvements, both to cover 
the risk premium and the extra gift. 
Despite some well-  publicized examples of wage concessions when work-
ers buy out their companies or accept large ownership stakes (which make 
up a very small percentage of the employee ownership landscape), workers 
in employee ownership plans tend to have comparable or higher wages or 
compensation than other workers. In a pre/  post study of ESOPs adopted 
by public companies between 1980 and 2004, Kim and Ouimet (2008) ﬁ  nd 
signiﬁ  cant increases in employee compensation following the adoption of 
ESOPs, particularly for ESOPs owning more than 5 percent of a company 
where the long-  term increase in compensation is 4.5 percent. A similar 
method used on German ﬁ  rms adopting proﬁ  t- sharing plans also concluded 
that proﬁ  t sharing supplemented rather than substituted for standard com-
pensation (Ugarkovi 2007). Blasi, Conte, and Kruse (1996) found that US 
public companies with broad-  based employee ownership plans had 8 per-
cent higher average compensation levels than other comparable public com-
panies, and compensation increased with the percentage of stock held by 
employees. Studies of pay and beneﬁ  ts in ESOP and non-  ESOP ﬁ  rms in 
Massachusetts and Washington state also found that the levels of pay and 
other beneﬁ  ts were similar between these two types of ﬁ  rms, so that ESOPs 
appear to come on top of other worker pay and beneﬁ  ts (Kardas, Scharf, 
and Keogh 1998; Scharf and Mackin 2000). With regard to other forms of 
ownership, Renaud, St- Onge, and Magnan (2004) found that stock purchase 
plan participation was associated with subsequent pay increases for employ-
ees, and employer stock held in 401(k) plans appears to come largely on top 
of other pension assets (Kroumova 2000). Seven studies from the United 
States, Great Britain, and Germany ﬁ  nd that proﬁ  t-  sharing ﬁ  rms also have 
generally higher average compensation than otherwise-  comparable ﬁ  rms 
(Kruse 1993, 113–  14; Handel and Gittleman 2004).
Still, it is possible that the higher pay levels associated with shared capital-
ist compensation reﬂ  ect higher unmeasured worker quality, and that workers 
in fact take a cut in compensation to link their pay to company performance. 
But the evidence runs against these possibilities. Kruse (1998) found that 
average base pay levels and other beneﬁ  ts increase as young workers join 
proﬁ  t-  sharing ﬁ  rms and decrease as they leave such ﬁ  rms, so worker selectiv-
ity cannot dominate the cross-  section relation. Similarly, Azfar and Dan-
ninger (2001) found that employees in proﬁ  t-  sharing plans receive higher 
annual raises in base pay than employees in other ﬁ  rms, connected in part 
to the greater training noted earlier. Other studies ﬁ  nd that neither wages 
nor total labor costs exclusive of the sharing component fall signiﬁ  cantly in 
pre/ post comparisons of ﬁ  rms that adopt proﬁ  t sharing (Black, Lynch, and 
Krivelyova [2004] for wages; Cappelli and Neumark [2004] for total labor Do Workers Gain by Sharing?    2 6 1
costs). The implication is that trade-  oﬀs between base pay and shared capi-
talist compensation are minimal and that proﬁ  t sharing may be used in con-
junction with higher base pay levels as part of an eﬃciency wage strategy.
Another possibility is that the higher monetary compensation associated 
with shared capitalist systems may come at the cost of greater eﬀort, stress, 
workplace danger, or other disamenities at work. Some analysts view the 
systems as a bit of a sham, designed to elicit greater worker eﬀort and to 
shift risk to workers, without increasing the pay or quality of jobs. This is 
“‘management by stress’ . . . which believes that [employee involvement] is 
simply a method of sweating the workforce and curbing worker power and 
inﬂ  uence” (Handel and Levine 2004, 6).
Our data allows us to compare compensation for workers covered and not 
covered by the shared capitalist compensation and to compare compensation 
for workers by the intensity of their shared compensation arrangements.
8.1.4    Job  Security
Traditional theoretical analysis of hypothetical labor-  run ﬁ  rms predicts 
that they have lower employment than in management-  run ﬁ  rms, and re-
spond perversely to demand shocks, lowering employment when output 
prices increase (reviewed in Bonin and Putterman [1987]). Most empiri-
cal studies show that employee ownership ﬁ  rms tend to have more stable 
employment than other ﬁ  rms, and do not respond perversely to demand 
shocks (Craig and Pencavel 1992, 1993; Blair, Kruse, and Blasi 2000). Two 
studies report that employment grew faster in ﬁ  rms following the adoption 
of ESOPs, particularly if they had greater employee participation in decision 
making (Quarrey and Rosen 1993; Winther and Marens 1997). In addition, 
public ﬁ  rms with substantial employee ownership are more likely than other 
comparable ﬁ  rms to survive over time (Blair, Kruse, and Blasi 2000; Park, 
Kruse, and Sesil 2004). French worker cooperatives also have high rates of 
survival (Estrin and Jones 1992).
Proﬁ  t sharing, in contrast, should create excess demand for employment 
and thus provide substantial job security (Weitzman 1984). Nineteen studies 
have examined Weitzman’s predictions that proﬁ  t sharing should stabilize 
ﬁ  rm employment (Kruse 1998, 109–  13). A majority found that ﬁ  rms view 
proﬁ  t sharing diﬀerently from ﬁ  xed wages in making employment decisions. 
Of the twelve studies directly examining employment stability, six found 
greater employment stability under proﬁ  t sharing; four showed greater sta-
bility in some but not all samples; while two have little or no support for the 
stabilizing eﬀects of proﬁ  t sharing.
8.1.5    Job  Satisfaction
If shared capitalism is associated with greater participation and deci-
sion making at the workplace, better supervision, more training, more job 
security, and higher total compensation, these modes of pay ought to raise 262    Douglas L. Kruse, Richard B. Freeman, and Joseph R. Blasi
job satisfaction. But the twelve existing studies on job satisfaction under 
employee ownership yield no clear generalization.1 Several studies show 
higher satisfaction; several show no relationship; and one study shows lower 
satisfaction among employee- owners where the union had lost a bitter strike 
the year before.2 Participation in decisions seems to be important: one lon-
gitudinal study found that satisfaction went up only among those who per-
ceived increased participation in decisions after an employee buyout (Long 
1982). Our data provide the largest sample for assessing these inconclusive 
ﬁ  ndings.
In sum, prior research on employee outcomes under shared capitalism 
has yielded generally positive results, though there is suﬃcient variability 
in some results to suggest that they depend on the context in which they are 
implemented. By addressing all of the employee outcomes with the GSS and 
the NBER data sets, and providing more robust measures of the employ-
ment context inside these ﬁ  rms, we should be better able to provide a more 
consistent generalization than the existing work. These studies span a period 
of a quarter century. It must be recognized, for example, that the phenom-
enon of employee decision making and shared capitalism may have been 
evolving over this period. (For an example of evolution in Silicon Valley, 
see Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein [2003].)
8.2    Data  and  Analysis
This chapter uses the GSS and NBER data sets (described in the “Study-
ing Shared Capitalism” section of the introduction to this volume). Our key 
independent variable of interest is the thermometer-  style index of shared 
capitalism, which assigns points based on coverage by shared capitalism 
programs and the size of the ﬁ  nancial stakes. This index is described in 
appendix B. We also present results breaking out the diﬀerent forms of 
shared capitalism types and intensities using the NBER data.
We have organized employee outcomes into eight areas: participation in 
decisions, company treatment of employees, supervision, training, pay and 
beneﬁ  ts, co-  worker relations, job security, and job satisfaction. These out-
comes are related to each other—for example, training generally leads to 
higher pay; participation in decisions, training, job security, and supervision 
are likely to aﬀect perceptions of how the company treats employees; and 
so on. We lack instruments to identify causality, so we do not try to tease 
1. This is based on nine studies on job satisfaction in Kruse and Blasi (1997); plus Pendleton, 
Wilson, and Wright (1998); Keef (1998); and Bakan et al. (2004). The studies were selected if 
they used systematic data collection from representative samples of employees, and used sta-
tistical techniques to rule out sampling error. Many used multivariate analysis to hold constant 
the eﬀect of other factors on employee attitudes or behavior.
2. Reminders by management that the strike would hurt ESOP account values brought the 
response “We don’t vote; we don’t control the company; we don’t care” (Kruse 1984, 51).Do Workers Gain by Sharing?    2 6 3
out possible causal links among the outcomes. Rather, we test for the re-
duced form relationship between shared capitalism and each of the indi-
vidual outcomes conditional on demographic and job characteristics, and in 
some cases on other outcomes as well—for example, since company training 
is likely to aﬀect pay, we examine whether shared capitalism is related to pay 
both before and after controlling for training.
8.3    Empirical  Results
We ﬁ rst use the shared capitalist index to predict each of the outcomes 
(table 8.1), and then probe the impact of diﬀerent types and intensities of 
shared capitalist compensation using the NBER data set (tables 8A.1 to 
8A.5). We estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions when outcomes 
are numeric and use ordered probits when the outcomes have three or four 
values with a natural ordering (e.g., “not at all true, not very true, somewhat 
true, and very true”). The regression predicting hours of training use a Tobit 
speciﬁ  cation, to account for the censoring at zero. Most of the regressions 
using the NBER data set include company ﬁ  xed eﬀects so that coeﬃcients 
reﬂ  ect within- company  diﬀerences rather than cross-  company diﬀerences 
that might be due to unmeasured diﬀerences among the companies. At the 
bottom of tables 8A.1 to 8A.5, some ESOP coeﬃcients are reported where 
company ﬁ  xed eﬀects are not used. Federal Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) law imposes strict requirements on coverage so that 
most or all employees are covered by an ESOP within a ﬁ  rm; the small num-
ber of excluded employees are thus likely to diﬀer in some particular way 
from other employees in the same ﬁ  rm. Because of this the ESOP eﬀects are 
better determined by comparing otherwise-  similar ESOP and non-  ESOP 
workers across ﬁ  rms in the speciﬁ  cations without ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
Table 8.1 summarizes our empirical results in terms of the coeﬃcients 
on the shared capitalism index variable for the eight outcomes under study. 
In most cases, we examine more than one outcome under the speciﬁ  ed do-
main.
8.3.1      Employee Participation in Decisions
Almost all of the measures of participation in decision making in table 
8.1 are positively and signiﬁ  cantly related to the shared capitalism index 
in both the GSS national and NBER data sets. There are two exceptions 
in the NBER data—the relationships with participation in company deci-
sions and satisfaction with participation in the NBER data, but only after 
controlling for other outcomes (employee involvement team, training, and 
job security). This indicates that shared capitalism is strongly correlated with 
these policies, and the package of these policies may be the most important 
determinant (which we examine in table 8.2).
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8A.1, the most consistent result is that proﬁ  t-  sharing intensity (measured 
using the most recent bonus as a percent of pay) is linked to greater par-
ticipation in decisions and greater satisfaction with participation (columns 
[1] through [5]). The small negative coeﬃcients on proﬁ  t sharing eligibility 
(columns [2], [3], and [5]) indicate that very low proﬁ  t sharing bonuses are 
associated with lower participation and satisfaction—an eﬀect that is erased 
as the bonus size increases. In addition, employee ownership is linked to 
greater participation in decisions (columns [1] through [4]) but satisfaction 
with participation is linked to employee-  owned stock as a percent of pay 
(column [5]).
Examining the diﬀerent types of employee ownership, the data show some 
signiﬁ  cant associations but no strong patterns. The 401(k) stock intensity is 
associated with greater involvement in job and department decisions (col-
umns [1] and [2]), while involvement in company decisions is highest among 
those with any 401(k) employer stock or those who retain stock from exer-
cised options (column [3]). These latter two groups are also more likely to 
be in employee involvement (EI) teams (column [4]), while satisfaction with 
participation is highest among those holding open market stock or with 
large ESOP or 401(k) stakes (column [5]). As noted earlier, given the ERISA 
rules about coverage within a company, it is more sensible to make inferences 
about the eﬀects of ESOPs by comparing workers between companies with 
and without ESOPs, which requires elimination of company ﬁ  xed eﬀects in 
the calculations. When this is done at the bottom of table 8A.1, the estimates 
show that ESOP participants are more likely to be involved in job, depart-
ment, and company decisions (columns [1] through [3]), but are much less 
likely to be satisﬁ  ed with their participation (column [5]). This latter result, 
which is consistent with the within-  company comparison, suggests that the 
simple membership in ESOPs in these companies may have raised the desire 
for participation more than they raised actual participation (or alternatively, 
that the additional participation itself raised desires for more participation 
in ESOP companies) so that one must examine the incentive intensity of 
the ESOP. The impact of an ESOP on satisfaction with participation is 
more closely tied to the ESOP value as a percent of pay—that is, owner-
ship intensity in relationship to one’s economic situation—than to simple 
membership in an ESOP plan.
8.3.2      Company Treatment of Employees
Both the GSS and the NBER company survey asked a variety of quality 
of work life questions. Item 2 in table 8.1 contains results for ten of those 
measures.3
The national survey data give generally positive results. Shared capital-
3. The GSS contains other quality of work life measures that we also analyzed. The results 
(available on request) were broadly similar across these measures, generally showing positive 
relationships to proﬁ  t sharing but not to the other shared capitalism measures.Do Workers Gain by Sharing?    2 7 1
ism employees are more likely to say that they are treated with respect, 
management-  employee relations are good, promotions are handled fairly, 
and worker safety is a high priority with management. A measure that re-
ﬂ  ects directly on the “management by stress” theories is the employee’s per-
ception of stress at work, which is not signiﬁ  cantly related to the shared 
capitalism index. In additional calculations not presented here, we examined 
the positive worker safety result using breakdowns by type of shared capi-
talism program. In contrast to studies that found no consistent relationship 
between employee ownership and worker safety (Rooney 1992; Rhodes and 
Steers 1981), our data show that employee-  owners as well as proﬁ  t-  sharers 
are more likely to report that worker safety is a high priority with man-
agement.
The NBER data, in contrast, show consistently positive results for shared 
capitalism and company treatment. Shared capitalism is positively linked to 
perceptions that the company shares success with employees and is fair to 
employees, and to grades workers give to the company on sharing informa-
tion, trustworthiness, and employee relations. These positive associations 
become smaller in magnitude but remain positive and highly signiﬁ  cant 
when controlling for several human resource policies (being in an EI team, 
training, and job security). Disaggregating by type of shared capitalism 
program in table 8A.2, proﬁ  t sharing and gain sharing eligibility are strongly 
linked to perceptions that the company shares and is fair to employees (col-
umns [1] and [2]), while proﬁ  t-  sharing intensity is strongly associated with 
all three of the grades (columns [3] through [5]). Employee-  owners are also 
more likely to say the company shares with employees (column [1]), while 
the size of the ownership stake is a strong predictor of each of the ﬁ  ve mea-
sures.
Comparisons among employee ownership types show an interesting dis-
parity. Having more employer stock in a 401(k) plan is positively linked to 
each of the measures, while ESOP membership and stake are positively 
associated with perceptions that the company shares with employees, but 
ESOP membership is negatively associated with the other four perceptions 
of company treatment both with and without company ﬁ  xed eﬀects. This is 
consistent with the ﬁ  nding that ESOP members are less likely to be satisﬁ  ed 
with their participation in decisions.
8.3.3    Supervision
Since incentive programs are one way to reduce the principal-  agent 
problem when supervision is diﬃcult or costly, we expect less supervision 
in shared capitalist environments. In addition, we expect supervisors to be 
more concerned with maintaining a cooperative atmosphere that helps solve 
the free rider problem than with watching workers work.
The GSS asked respondents for views of their supervisors, while the 
NBER survey asked about the degree of supervision. As seen in item 3 of 
table 8.1, shared capitalism employees are more likely to see their supervisors 272    Douglas L. Kruse, Richard B. Freeman, and Joseph R. Blasi
as helpful and caring, while they are less likely to report that they are closely 
supervised both before and after controlling for other HR policies. When 
broken out by type of shared capitalism program in table 8A.3, the strongly 
signiﬁ  cant result is that ESOP members have greater freedom from supervi-
sion (column [1]). Most of the coeﬃcients on other programs are positive, 
which indicates that each program contributes to the strongly positive shared 
capitalism coeﬃcient in table 8.2.
8.3.4    Training
The national GSS data in table 8.2 show that shared capitalism employees 
are more likely to say they have the training opportunities they need. The 
NBER data show that they report a higher likelihood of formal job training 
in the past year, greater hours of training, and higher levels of informal job 
training from fellow workers, with and without controls for participation 
in an EI team and job security. The breakdowns by plan in table 8A.3 show 
that both training and hours of training are higher among workers with 
proﬁ  t sharing and employee owners, and are also positively linked to size of 
gain- sharing bonus and employee ownership stake. But training is negatively 
related to the size of stock option value from future potential proﬁ  ts (col-
umns [2] and [3]). Among the types of employee ownership, training and 
training hours are highest among ESOP participants and those with 401(k) 
employer stock.
The pattern of coeﬃcients is quite diﬀerent for informal job training from 
co-  workers, which suggests that informal job training often substitutes for 
formal training. Both stock option holding and the size of the stake are 
positively linked to informal training (table 8A.3, column [4]). Also, while 
ESOP members are more likely to get formal training, they are less likely 
to get informal training. Gain sharing is positively associated with informal 
training, as is the size of a workers’ higher proﬁ  t-  sharing stake. The broad 
range of associations between shared capitalism and formal and informal 
training suggest that training is complementary with shared capitalism.
8.3.5    Pay  and  Beneﬁ  ts
Table 8.1 shows that pay tends to be higher among employees with greater 
shared capitalist forms of pay in both the national GSS and NBER company 
data. Employees in the NBER company data set with greater shared capital-
ism are more likely to say that their ﬁ  xed pay is at least equal to market and 
their compensation is higher than market. Shared capitalism employees in 
the national survey are more likely to feel they are paid what they deserve. 
Employees with greater shared capitalism in both data sets rate their com-
panies as better on fringe beneﬁ  ts. The NBER results are not aﬀected by the 
inclusion of several human resource policies. When the shared capitalism 
programs are broken out in table 8A.4, most of the shared capitalism types 
are associated with higher ﬁ  xed pay, though the gain-  sharing bonus inten-Do Workers Gain by Sharing?    2 7 3
sity and employee ownership stake are inversely related to pay. There are 
few associations with the employee’s rating of ﬁ  xed pay relative to market 
(column [2]), but total compensation relative to market is higher among gain 
sharers and those who have bigger proﬁ  t- sharing bonuses and are employee-
  owners through Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) and 401(k) plans 
(columns [4] and [5]). The pay and beneﬁ  t results indicate that shared capital-
ism does not generally substitute for ﬁ  xed pay or other beneﬁ  ts. This rejects 
a simple compensating diﬀerences story of shared capitalist modes of pay, 
although the higher pay may help compensate for greater eﬀort or other 
forms of costly behavior.
8.3.6    Co-  Worker  Relations
Does shared capitalism help or hurt relations with fellow workers? Em-
ployees with greater shared capitalism in the GSS data set are more likely to 
report that their co- workers can be relied on for help when needed, and that 
their co- workers take a personal interest in them. Such helpfulness and inter-
est presumably make work more pleasant and increase employee welfare 
directly, but may also lay the foundation for cooperation among employees 
that can increase workplace performance (explored in chapters 2 and 4).
8.3.7    Job  Security
Shared capitalism is associated with greater job security. Employees higher 
in the shared capitalist index report a lower likelihood of losing their jobs, 
and in the national GSS data they report a lower likelihood of being laid oﬀ 
in the past year. The NBER results are maintained when controlling for par-
ticipation in an EI team and receipt of training. When broken out by shared 
capitalism policy, both proﬁ  t-  sharing eligibility and the size of the proﬁ  t 
share are linked to greater job security (table 8A.5, column [1]). Owning 
employer stock, and the size of the ownership stake and stock option value, 
are also positively associated with job security. The breakdowns by type of 
employee ownership indicate that job security is highest among ESOP par-
ticipants and those holding 401(k) employer stock, and those with greater 
holdings in both of those plans. The ﬁ  ndings that job security is greater for 
employee-  owners than for other workers is consistent with prior research 
on the employment stability and company survival of employee ownership 
ﬁ  rms (Blair, Kruse, and Blasi 2000; Park, Kruse, and Sesil 2004).
8.3.8    Job  Satisfaction
Job satisfaction is positively linked to the shared capitalism index in both 
the national GSS and NBER company data, but the result is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant only in the NBER data. This NBER result disappears, however, 
when controlling for the human resource policies. The strong association 
between shared capitalism and these human resource policies indicates that 
there may be important complementarities, which we explore in table 8.2. 274    Douglas L. Kruse, Richard B. Freeman, and Joseph R. Blasi
When the policies are broken out in table 8A.5, job satisfaction is positively 
associated with the size of the proﬁ  t- sharing and gain- sharing bonuses, and 
with participation in an ESOP when company ﬁ  xed eﬀects are removed 
(column [2]). The positive ESOP result on job satisfaction presumably re-
ﬂ  ects the positive eﬀects of ESOP membership on training, freedom from 
supervision, rating of beneﬁ  ts, and job security overpowering ESOP par-
ticipants’ lower satisfaction with participation in decisions (table 8A.1) and 
their lower ratings for the company on several measures (table 8A.2).
8.3.9    Complementarities
Both theory and evidence support the idea that there may be important 
complementarities among human resource policies in aﬀecting workplace 
performance (e.g., Levine and Tyson 1990; Huselid 1995; Ichniowski et al. 
1996). These complementarities may also aﬀect employee outcomes: for ex-
ample, job satisfaction may be increased more by combining shared capital-
ism with employee involvement and training than by the sum of the policies 
in isolation.
Measurement of high- performance human resource policies varies among 
studies. One analysis divides them into seven broad categories: group incen-
tive pay, teamwork/  employee involvement, training, employment security, 
information sharing, ﬂ  exible job assignment, and recruitment and selection 
(Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997). The NBER surveys contain mea-
sures of each of these, but not for every company.4 For our investigation 
of complementarities, we created a human resource policy index that gives 
one point each for being in an employee involvement team, receiving formal 
training in the past twelve months, and having high job security, and we then 
interact this index with the shared capitalism index.5
Shared capitalism may also interact with supervision in aﬀecting employee 
outcomes. Shared capitalist policies may, as noted, help substitute for close 
supervision of workers by providing greater incentives for workers to work 
hard and monitor their co-  workers. The ﬁ  nding that shared capitalism is 
associated with greater freedom from supervision lends support to this 
idea (table 8.1). When shared capitalist policies are combined with close 
supervision, however, the results may be negative. If workers are not given 
much latitude in how they do their work, shared capitalist policies may serve 
mainly to shift ﬁ  nancial risk to workers, resulting in more negative worker 
behavior and attitudes. At a minimum, combining shared capitalism with 
4. Flexible job assignment was measured as job rotation at six companies, and rigorous selec-
tion was measured at one large company.
5. We also experimented with indices using measures of information sharing, job rotation, 
and rigorous selection, producing a similar pattern of results. Here we use the index based 
only on employee involvement, training, and job security since the sample sizes are smaller 
for job rotation and rigorous selection, and the grade of the company on sharing information 
reﬂ  ects an employee evaluation of the policy’s success (highly correlated with evaluations of 
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close supervision sends a mixed message to employees: “We want you to 
work harder and be more committed to the company because of your (proﬁ  t 
share/ employer stock/ stock options), but we’re still going to keep a close eye 
on you.” Workers may not respond well to this mixed message.
Table 8.2 assesses interactions between the shared capitalism index and 
other workplace policies to assess possible complementarities in eﬀects on 
employee attitudes. The statistical analysis shows that shared capitalism 
interacts with high performance policies and supervision in aﬀecting a num-
ber of employee outcomes.6 The interaction with high performance policies 
shows that employees are especially likely to have high participation, and to 
be satisﬁ  ed with their participation, when they are covered by both shared 
capitalist and high performance policies (column [3]). The interaction is 
also positive with informal training and overall job satisfaction. The inter-
action is negative, however, on perceptions of company sharing, fairness, 
and beneﬁ  ts; the coeﬃcients indicate that shared capitalism has a positive 
eﬀect both for those with and without high performance policies, but has a 
more positive eﬀect for those who are not also covered by high performance 
policies.
The pattern is more straightforward with respect to supervision: the 
combination of shared capitalism with close supervision produces a more 
negative outcome in almost every case (column [5]). The main eﬀect of 
close supervision is generally positive (column [4]), indicating that in the 
absence of shared capitalism, having close supervision may often be a good 
thing (e.g., giving workers a better sense of what they are supposed to do). 
But the main eﬀect is counteracted in most cases, however, by the negative 
shared capitalism interaction—for example, the predicted overall eﬀect of 
increased supervision on perceptions of company fairness is negative when-
ever the shared capitalism index is 2 or greater.
The contingent eﬀects of shared capitalism on job satisfaction are illus-
trated in ﬁ  gure 8.1, which uses the regression results from table 8.2. When 
workers are covered by high performance policies and have low or average 
levels of supervision, the eﬀects of increased shared capitalism are posi-
tive (top two lines). When they are not covered by high-  performance poli-
cies, and/  or are very closely supervised, the eﬀects of shared capitalism are 
slightly or very negative (bottom four lines). While the overall relationship 
between shared capitalism and job satisfaction is close to zero after control-
ling for other policies (table 8.1), these results illustrate that the other policies 
can greatly condition the eﬀects of shared capitalism.
The same caveats issued in the “Studying Shared Capitalism” section of 
the introduction and in chapter 4 apply here. The GSS ﬁ  ndings may reﬂ  ect 
6. When the high performance index included the outcome being predicted, that item was 
deleted from the high performance index (e.g., employee involvement was deleted from the high 
performance index in predicting participation in an employee involvement team).276    Douglas L. Kruse, Richard B. Freeman, and Joseph R. Blasi
selectivity of shared capitalist ﬁ  rms, or of workers into shared capitalism 
ﬁ  rms, and the NBER ﬁ  ndings may reﬂ  ect selectivity of workers into shared 
capitalism plans within the ﬁ  rms. Such selectivity makes causal interpreta-
tions open to criticism. As described in the “Studying Shared Capitalism” 
section, we experimented with speciﬁ  cations to reduce endogeneity but had 
little luck in ﬁ  nding suitable exogenous variables that would predict the 
endogenous variables but not directly aﬀect the outcome variables of inter-
est. Even if there is substantial selectivity among workers or ﬁ  rms, however, 
such selectivity may operate primarily to lead workers and ﬁ  rms into shared 
capitalism arrangements where it is most likely to have beneﬁ  ts. If this is 
the case, the shared capitalism is having good eﬀects even in the presence of 
selectivity, although we are not able to conﬁ  dently infer what would happen 
if other workers and ﬁ  rms adopted shared capitalism.
8.4    Conclusion
Do workers gain by sharing? The evidence generally supports an answer 
of “yes,” with some caveats. Both the national GSS and NBER company 
data indicate that shared capitalism is positively linked to participation in 
decisions, evaluations of company climate and employee treatment, percep-
tions of helpfulness by supervisors, lower levels of supervision, and higher 
levels of training, pay and beneﬁ  ts, job security, and job satisfaction. Almost 
all of these relationships remain strong when controlling for other human 
resource policies. This rejects the “management by stress” theories of work 
innovation.
When broken out by type of shared capitalist program, proﬁ  t sharing was 
Fig. 8.1    The contingent eﬀects of shared capitalism on job satisfactionDo Workers Gain by Sharing?    2 7 7
most consistently linked to the positive outcomes, although gainsharing, 
stock options, and employee ownership also aﬀect some outcomes posi-
tively. In many cases the positive eﬀect was tied to simply being covered by 
a policy (e.g., being eligible for proﬁ  t sharing, or being an employee- owner), 
but there were also many cases in which the eﬀect was tied to the size of the 
ﬁ  nancial stake involved (size of most recent bonus, or value of employer 
stock or stock options).
Estimated negative relations between some aspects of shared capitalism 
and some outcomes are also informative about how this form of ﬁ  nancial 
sharing operates. In particular, while being a member of an ESOP was linked 
to a number of positive outcomes (participation in decisions, perception 
that the company shares, freedom from supervision, formal training, pay 
and beneﬁ  t levels, job security, and job satisfaction), in the NBER data 
set ESOP members also had lower satisfaction with participation in deci-
sions and lower ratings of the company on fairness, trustworthiness, and 
employee relations. One possible reason is that employee-  owners may be 
frustrated by unfulﬁ  lled desires for greater participation in decisions (above 
the higher levels they already have). Another possible reason is that some 
ESOP accounts have too little stock to be meaningful and some employees 
may have negative attitudes when they are called owners but have very little 
ownership so the size of the ownership stake is important. The importance 
of the size of the ownership stake is highlighted by the ﬁ  nding that satisfac-
tion with participation rises with the value of employee-  owned stock as a 
percent of pay. The dynamics of employee ownership may work diﬀerently 
for ESOPs than for other forms of ownership: it is the only form where 
all eligible workers are automatically enrolled and called owners even with 
miniscule accounts.
Finally, our data reveals potentially important complementarities of 
shared capitalism with other workplace policies, particularly with high per-
formance work policies and closeness of supervision. Those who are covered 
by the combination of high-  performance policies with shared capitalism 
are most likely to report high participation in decisions, satisfaction with 
participation, and overall job satisfaction. The combination of close super-
vision with shared capitalism, however, has negative eﬀects on almost every 
outcome.
Overall, our ﬁ  ndings are consistent with theories that stress the linkage 
between group incentive pay systems and other labor and personnel rela-
tions policies. Taken as a package, a high performance work system involves 
greater participation, higher quality of supervision, more formal training, 
better wages and beneﬁ  ts, higher job satisfaction, and better job security. 
Employers who are concerned about company performance, and workers 
who are concerned about the quality of their working life, have reasons to 
be interested in this package. Our ﬁ  ndings that shared capitalist programs 
are often associated with these policies and outcomes indicate that there is 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 8A.5  Job security and satisfaction by type of shared capitalism plan





Dependent variable:   (1)   (2)
Bonuses
  Proﬁ  t sharing 0.102 (0.021)∗∗∗ –0.063 (0.023)∗∗∗
  Proﬁ  t-  sharing bonus as % of base pay 0.486 (0.098)∗∗∗ 0.255 (0.105)∗∗
  Gain  sharing 0.068  (0.027)∗∗∗ 0.025 (0.029)
    Gain-  sharing bonus as % of base pay –0.021 (0.109) 0.270 (0.117)∗∗
  Individual  bonus 0.057  (0.026)∗∗ 0.023 (0.028)
    Individual bonus as % of base pay –0.046 (0.112) 0.168 (0.121)
Stock options
    Stock option holding 0.040 (0.039) –0.008 (0.041)
    Stock option value as % of base pay 0.011 (0.005)∗∗ 0.007 (0.006)
Employee ownership
    Any employee ownership 0.082 (0.020)∗∗∗ –0.006 (0.021)
    Employee-  owned stock as % of pay 0.018 (0.009)∗∗ 0.001 (0.010)
n 34,671 34,525
(Pseudo) R2 0.042 0.107
Cut point 1 –1.917 (0.259)
Cut point 2 –1.175 (0.259)
Cut point 3 0.476 (0.259)
Breakdowns by type of employee ownership
  ESOP –0.001  (0.056) –0.038  (0.059)
    ESOP stock as % of pay 0.042 (0.021)∗∗ –0.002 (0.022)
  ESPP –0.058  (0.040) –0.027  (0.042)
    ESPP stock as % of pay –0.005 (0.031) –0.001 (0.033)
  401(k)  stock 0.096  (0.018)∗∗∗ –0.001 (0.020)
    401(k) stock as % of pay 0.054 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.018 (0.017)
    Stock from options –0.089 (0.038)∗∗ –0.006 (0.041)
    Stock from options as % of pay 0.013 (0.020) –0.003 (0.022)
    Open mkt. stock as % of pay 0.038 (0.046) –0.033 (0.049)
    Open mkt. stock 0.008 (0.029) 0.005 (0.031)
ESOP coeﬃcients without ﬁ  xed eﬀects
  ESOP 0.299  (0.034)∗∗∗ 0.090 (0.036)∗∗∗
    ESOP stock as % of pay   0.043 (0.020)∗∗   –0.029 (0.020)
Notes: All regressions include the control variables from table 8.2. Standard error in parenthe-
ses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Do Workers Gain by Sharing?    2 8 7
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